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Abstract. Runtime enforcement is an increasingly popular and effective dynamic validation technique aiming to
ensure the correct runtime behavior (w.r.t. a formal specification) of systems using a so-called enforcement monitor.
In this paper we introduce runtime enforcement of specifications on component-based systems (CBS) modeled
in the BIP (Behavior, Interaction and Priority) framework. BIP is a powerful and expressive component-based
framework for formal construction of heterogeneous systems. However, because of BIP expressiveness, it remains
difficult to enforce at design-time complex behavioral properties.
First we propose a theoretical runtime enforcement framework for CBS where we delineate a hierarchy of sets of
enforceable properties (i.e., properties that can be enforced) according to the number of observational steps a sys-
tem is allowed to deviate from the property (i.e., the notion of k-step enforceability). To ensure the observational
equivalence between the correct executions of the initial system and the monitored system, we show that i) only
stutter-invariant properties should be enforced on CBS with our monitors, ii) safety properties are 1-step enforce-
able. Given an abstract enforcement monitor (as a finite-state machine) for some 1-step enforceable specification,
we formally instrument (at relevant locations) a given BIP system to integrate the monitor. At runtime, the monitor
observes and automatically avoids any error in the behavior of the system w.r.t. the specification. Our approach
is fully implemented in an available tool that we used to i) avoid deadlock occurrences on a dining philosophers
benchmark, and ii) ensure the correct placement of robots on a map.
1 Introduction
Users wanting to build complex, distributed, heterogeneous systems dispose of a variety of complementary
verification techniques such as model-checking, static analysis, testing, and runtime verification to detect
bugs and errors. Techniques are often categorized as static (e.g., model-checking, static analysis) or dynamic
(e.g., testing, runtime verification) according to the sort of system information that is analyzed. Interestingly,
these techniques are complementary to each other in terms of desirable features. For instance, dynamic
techniques are scalable (they face the state-explosion problem) and can be applied when some parts of the
system are unknown or when verification with other techniques is undecidable. Both types of techniques
take as input some representation of the system, perform some analysis, and yield a verdict indicating the
(partial) correctness of the system in addition to providing some form of feedback to the user. Upon the
detection of an error in the system, the user’s activity enters a new phase consisting in correcting the system
and then submitting the corrected system to the analysis technique. This process is usually time-consuming
and not guaranteed to converge within the time frame associated to system implementation.
Motivations. We aim at marrying software synthesis and dynamic analysis to solve the aforementioned is-
sue. While runtime verification complements model-checking, we propose runtime enforcement (RE) (cf.
[1–3]) to complement model repair. While model repair targets correctness-by-construction, runtime en-
forcement, as proposed in this paper, targets correctness-at-operation. Runtime enforcement is an increas-
ingly popular and effective dynamic technique aiming at ensuring the correct runtime behavior (w.r.t. a
formal specification) of systems using a so-called enforcement monitor. At runtime, the monitor consumes
information from the execution (e.g., events) and modifies it whenever it is necessary to comply with the
specification by, e.g., suppressing forbidden events. To the best of our knowledge, enforcing properties at
runtime has been only studied for monolithic systems. Moreover, these frameworks remain at an abstract
level, and do not specify how systems should be instrumented.
We target component-based systems (CBS) expressed in the BIP (Behavior, Interaction and Priority)
framework (see Sec. 3) [4–6]. BIP uses a dedicated language and toolset supporting a rigorous design flow.
The BIP language allows to build complex systems by coordinating the behavior of a set of atomic compo-
nents. Behavior is described with Labelled Transition Systems extended with data and functions written in
C. Coordination between components is layered. The first layer describes the interactions between compo-
nents. The second layer describes dynamic priorities between the interactions to express scheduling policies.
The combination of interactions and priorities characterizes the overall architecture of a system. This layered
architecture confers a strong expressiveness to BIP [4]. Moreover, BIP has a rigorous operational semantics:
the behavior of a composite component is formally described as the composition of the behaviors of its
atomic components. This allows a direct relation between the underlying semantic model and its (automati-
cally synthesized) implementation.
Contributions. This paper proposes an effective runtime enforcement technique to easily integrate correct-
ness properties into a component-based system. Our approach favors the design and correctness of safety-
critical systems by allowing a separation of concerns for system designers. Indeed, the functional part of the
system and its safety requirements can be designed in separation, and then latter integrated together with
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our approach. The resulting supervised system prevents any error from happening. More specifically, the
contributions of this paper are as follows:
– to introduce runtime enforcement to monitor and avoid any error in the execution of CBS;
– to introduce a new paradigm for runtime enforcement: previous runtime enforcement approaches in-
troduced enforcement monitors that can store “bad events” in their memory without the possibility of
cancelling these events (rolling the system back) to explore alternative executions (see Sec. 7 for a more
detailed comparison with related work): the runtime enforcement paradigm proposed in this paper pre-
vents the occurrence of misbehaviors in the targeted system;3
– to propose an instrumentation technique that minimally alters the behavior of component-based systems
and allows the observation and modification of their behavior;
– to propose a series of formal transformations that takes as input a component-based system and a desired
property to produce a supervised system where the property is enforced: the resulting system produces
only the correct executions (of the initial system) w.r.t. the considered property, with low overhead;
– to implement the instrumentation and the transformations in RE-BIP, an available toolset;
– to validate the effectiveness of the whole approach by enforcing properties over non-trivial systems
(where a static hand-coding of the properties using connectors and priorities would have not been
tractable): deadlock freedom on dining philosophers and the correct placement of robots on a map.
Challenges. When synthesizing enforcement monitors for component-based systems, the main difficulties
that arise are:
– to handle the possible interactions and synchronizations between components: when intervening on the
behavior of a component by e.g., suppressing the execution of a transition, we need to make sure that
the synchronized components are also prevented from performing a connected transition;
– to preserve the observational equivalence between the initial system (restricted to its correct execution
sequences) and the monitored system: for this purpose, i) our transformations leverage the use of priority
in BIP, and ii) we identify the set of stutter-invariant properties for which enforcement monitors can be
synthesized and integrated into a system while preserving observational equivalence;
– to propose an efficient instrumentation technique that ensures that the enforcement monitor receives all
events of interest of the property while not degrading the performance of the initial system, for this
purpose, the transformations are efficiently implemented in RE-BIP.
3 In previous RE frameworks, instrumentation of the sysytem is taken for granted.
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Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some pre-
liminaries and notations. In Section 3, we recall the necessary concepts of the BIP framework. Section 4
presents, at an abstract level, a runtime enforcement framework for component-based systems. Section 5
shows how to instrument a BIP system to incorporate an enforcement monitor. Section 6 describes RE-
BIP, a full implementation of our framework and some benchmarks. Section 7 discusses related work and
presents the complementary advantages of our runtime enforcement approach over existing validation tech-
niques. Section 8 draws some conclusions and perspectives.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We introduce some preliminary concepts and notations.
Functions and partial functions. For two domains of elements E and F , we note [E → F ] (resp. [E ⇁ F ])
the set of functions (resp. partial functions) from E to F . When elements of E depend on the elements of F ,
we note {e ∈ E}f∈F ′ , where F ′ ⊆ F , for {e ∈ E | f ∈ F ′} or {e}f∈F ′ when clear from context. For two
functions v ∈ [X → Y ] and v′ ∈ [X ′ → Y ′], the substitution function noted v/v′, where v/v′ ∈ [X∪X ′ →
Y ∪ Y ′], is defined as: v/v′(x) = v′(x) if x ∈ X ′ and v(x) otherwise. A predicate over some domain E
is a function in the set [E → {true, false}] where true and false are the usual Boolean constants.
Given, some predicate p over some domain E and some element e ∈ E, we abbreviate p(e) = true (resp.
p(e) = false) by p(e) (resp. ¬p(e)).
Sequences. Given a set of elements E, a sequence of length n over E is denoted e1 · e2 · · · en where
∀i ∈ [1, n] : ei ∈ E. When a sequence s is a prefix of a sequence s′, we note it s  s′. When elements of a se-
quence are assignments, the sequence is delimited by square brackets, e.g., [x1 := expr1 ; . . . ;xn := exprn ].
Concatenation of assignments or sequences of assignments is denoted by “; ”. The set of all sequences over
E is noted E∗.
Transition Systems. Labelled Transition System (LTS) are used to define the semantics of (BIP) systems.
An LTS defined over an alphabet Σ is a 3-tuple 〈Lab,Loc,Trans〉 where Lab is a set of labels, Loc is a non-
empty set of locations and Trans ⊆ Loc×Lab×Loc is the transition relation. A transition 〈l, e, l′〉 ∈ Trans
means that the LTS can move from location l to location l′ by consuming label e. We abbreviate 〈l, e, l′〉 ∈
Trans by l e→Trans l′ or by l
e
→ l′ when clear from context. Moreover, l e→ is a short for ∃l′ ∈ Loc : l e→ l′.
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The traces of LTS L = 〈Lab,Loc,Trans〉, noted traces(L), are the finite sequences over Lab that can be
obtained starting from the initial state, concatenating the labels following the transition relation.
3 BIP - Behavior Interaction Priority
BIP [6] allows to construct systems by superposing three layers of modeling: Behavior, Interaction, and
Priority. The behavior layer consists of a set of atomic components represented by transition systems ex-
tended with C functions and data and labeled with communication ports. The interaction layer models the
collaboration between components. The priority layer specifies scheduling policies on the interaction layer.
3.1 Component-based Construction
Atomic Components. An atomic component B is endowed with a finite set of local variables B.vars
ranging over a domain Data. Atomic components synchronize and exchange data with each other through
ports.
Definition 1 (Port). A port 〈p, xp〉 in atomic component B, is defined by a port identifier p, and a set of
attached local variables xp, where xp ⊆ B.vars . When clear from context, we denote the port 〈p, xp〉 via
its identifier p, and its data variables xp via the dot notation p.vars .
Definition 2 (Atomic component). An atomic component B is defined as a tuple
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
, where:
– 〈P,L, T 〉 is an LTS over a set of ports P : L is a set of control locations and T ⊆ L× P × L is a set of
transitions;
– X is a set of variables;
– For each transition τ ∈ T : gτ is a Boolean condition over X: the guard of τ , and fτ ∈ {x := fx(X) |
x ∈ X}∗: the computation of τ , a sequence of assignments.
For τ = 〈l, p, l′〉 ∈ T a transition of the LTS, l (resp. l′) is referred to as the source (resp. destination)
location and p is a port through which an interaction with another component can take place. Moreover, a
transition τ = 〈l, p, l′〉 ∈ T in the internal LTS involves a transition in the atomic component of the form
〈l, p, gτ , fτ , l
′〉 which can be executed only if the guard gτ evaluates to true, and fτ is a computation step:
a set of assignments to local variables in X.
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In the sequel we use the dot notation. Given a transition τ = 〈l, p, gτ , fτ , l′〉, τ.src, τ.port , τ.guard ,
τ.func, and τ.dest denote l, p, gτ , fτ , and l′, respectively. Also, the set of variables used in a transition is
defined as var(fτ ) = {x ∈ X | x := fx(X) ∈ fτ}. Given an atomic component B, B.ports denotes the set
of ports of the atomic component B, B.locs denotes its set of locations, etc.
comp1p q
t
z
y
x
x > 0
p
[y := x+ t]
l′′ l′
q
l
Fig. 1: Atomic component
Example 1 (Atomic component). Figure 1, shows the atomic component comp1 with variables x, y, z, and
t, two ports p and q (p is attached to variables x and z), and three control locations l, l′, and l′′. At location l,
the transition labeled by port q is possible (the guard evaluates to true by default) and the transition labeled
by port p is possible provided x is positive. When an interaction through q takes place, variable y is assigned
to the value of x + t .
Definition 3 (Semantics of atomic components). The semantics of atomic component
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
is the LTS 〈P,Q, T0〉, where:
– Q = L× [X → Data]× (P ∪ {null}),
– T0 =
{〈
〈l, v, p〉 , p′(vp′), 〈l
′, v′, p′〉
〉
∈ Q× P ×Q | ∃τ = 〈l, p′, l′〉 ∈ T : gτ (v) ∧ v
′ = fτ (v/vp′)
}
,
where vp′ ∈ [p′.vars → Data].
A configuration is a triple 〈l, v, p〉 ∈ Q where l ∈ L is a control location, v ∈ [X → Data] is a valu-
ation of the variables in X, and p ∈ P is the port labeling the last-executed transition or null when no
transition has been executed (i.e., its value is null at component initialization). The evolution of config-
urations 〈l, v, p〉
p′(vp′ )
→ 〈l′, v′, p′〉, where vp′ is a valuation of the variables in p′.vars , is possible if there
exists a transition 〈l, p′, gτ , fτ , l′〉, s.t. gτ (v) = true. As a result, the valuation v of variables is modified to
v′ = fτ (v/vp′).
3.2 Creating Composite Components
Assuming some atomic components B1, . . . , Bn, we show how to connect the components in the set {Bi}i∈I
with I ⊆ [1, n] using a connector.
6
A connector γ is used to specify possible interactions, i.e., the sets of ports that have to be jointly ex-
ecuted. Two types of ports (synchron, trigger) are defined in order to specify the feasible interactions of a
connector. A trigger port (represented by a triangle) is active: the port can initiate an interaction without
synchronizing with other ports. A synchron port (represented by a circle) is passive: the port needs synchro-
nization with other ports to initiate an interaction. A feasible interaction of a connector is a subset of its ports
s.t. either it contains some trigger, or it is maximal.
✉ ✉ ✉ ✉
s r1 r2 r3
N
✉ ✉ ✉
s r1 r2 r3
Rendezvous Broadcast
On the right two connectors are depicted: Rendezvous (only the max-
imal interaction {s, r1, r2, r3} is possible), Broadcast (all interactions
containing trigger port s are possible).
Definition 4 (Connector). A connector γ is a tuple 〈Pγ , t, G, F 〉, where:
– Pγ = {pi | pi ∈ Bi.P}i∈I s.t. ∀i ∈ I : Pγ ∩Bi.P = {pi},
– t ∈ [Pγ → {true, false}] s.t. t(p) = true if p is trigger (and false otherwise),
– G is a Boolean expression over the set of variables ∪i∈I pi.vars (the guard),
– F is an update function defined over the set of variables ∪i∈I pi.vars .
Pγ is the set of connected ports of γ. A port in Pγ is tagged using a
function t indicating whether it is a trigger or synchron. Moreover, for
each i ∈ I , pi.vars is a set of variables associated with port pi.
A communication between the atomic components of {Bi}i∈I through a connector (Pγ , t, G, F ) is
defined using the notion of interaction.
Definition 5 (Interaction). A set of ports a = {pj}j∈J ⊆ Pγ for some J ⊆ I is an interaction of γ if either
there exists j ∈ J s.t. pj is trigger, or, for all j ∈ J , pj is synchron and {pj}j∈J = Pγ .
An interaction a has a guard and two functions Ga, Fa, respectively obtained by projecting G and F on the
variables of the ports involved in a. We denote by I(γ) the set of interactions of γ and I(γ1) ∪ . . . ∪ I(γn)
by I(γ1, . . . , γn). Synchronization through an interaction involves two steps: evaluating Ga, and applying
the update function Fa.
Definition 6 (Composite component). A composite component is defined from a set of available atomic
components {Bi}i∈I and a set of connectors Γ . The connection of the components in {Bi}i∈I using the set
Γ of connectors is denoted by Γ ({Bi}i∈I).
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Note that a composite component obtained by composing a set of atomic components can be composed with
other components in a hierarchical and incremental fashion using the same operational semantics.
Definition 7 (Semantics of composite components). A state q of a composite component
Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn}), where Γ connects the Bi’s for i ∈ [1, n], is an n-tuple q = 〈q1, . . . , qn〉 where
qi = 〈li, vi, pi〉 is a state of Bi. Thus, the semantics of Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn}) is defined as a transition system
〈Q,A,−→〉, where:
– Q = B1.Q× . . .×Bn.Q,
– A = ∪γ∈Γ {a ∈ I(γ)} is the set of all possible interactions,
– −→ is the least set of transitions satisfying the following rule:
∃γ ∈ Γ : γ = 〈Pγ , t, G, F 〉 ∃a ∈ I(γ) : a = {pi}i∈I Ga(v(X))
∀i ∈ I : qi
pi(vi)
−→ i q
′
i ∧ vi = Fai(v(X)) ∀i 6∈ I : qi = q
′
i
〈q1, . . . , qn〉
a
−→
〈
q′1, . . . , q
′
n
〉
where X is the set of variables attached to the ports of a, v is the global valuation, and Fai is the partial
function derived from F restricted to the variables of pi.
The meaning of the above rule is the following: if there exists an interaction a s.t. all its ports are enabled
in the current state and its guard (Ga(v(X))) evaluates to true, then the interaction can be fired. When a
is fired, all involved components evolve according to the interaction and not involved components remain in
the same state.
Several distinct interactions can be enabled at the same time, thus introducing non-determinism in the
product behavior. Priorities can reduce non-determinism: one of the interactions with the highest priority is
chosen in a non-deterministic manner.
Definition 8 (Priority). Let C = 〈Q,A,−→〉 be the behavior of the composite component
Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn}). A priority model π is a strict partial order on the set of interactions A. We abbre-
viate 〈a, a′〉 ∈ π by a ≺pi a′ or a ≺ a′ when clear from the context. Adding priority model π over
Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn}) defines a new composite component π
(
Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn})
)
noted π(C) and whose be-
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havior is defined by 〈Q,A,−→pi〉, where −→pi is the least set of transitions satisfying the following rule:
q
a
−→ q′ ¬
(
∃a′ ∈ A,∃q′′ ∈ Q : a ≺ a′ ∧ q
a′
−→ q′′
)
q
a
−→pi q
′
An interaction a is enabled in π(C) whenever a is enabled in C and a is maximal according to π among the
enabled interactions in C .
We adapt the notion of maximal progress to BIP systems. In BIP, the maximal progress property is
expressed at the level of connectors. For a given connector γ, if one interaction a ∈ I(γ) is contained in
another interaction a′ ∈ I(γ), then the latter has a higher priority, unless there exists an explicit priority
stating the contrary. Maximal progress is enforced by the BIP engine.
Definition 9 (Maximal progress). Given a connector γ and a priority model π, we have: ∀a, a′ ∈ I(γ):
(a ⊂ a′) ∧ (a′ ≺ a /∈ π) =⇒ a ≺ a′.
Finally, we consider systems defined as a parallel composition of components together with an initial state.
Definition 10 (System). A BIP system S is a pair 〈B, Init〉 where B is a component and Init ∈ B1.L ×
. . .×Bn.L is the initial state of B.
For the sake of simpler notation, Init designates both the initial state of the system at the syntax level and
the initial state of the underlying LTS.
Hierarchical connectors [4]. Given a connector γ we denote by γ.export to be the exported port of con-
nector γ, which is used to build hierarchical connectors. In that case, we use upward and downward update
functions instead of update functions only.
✉
◆ ◆ ◆
✉
❡①♣♦rt
s
r
✶
r
✷
r
✸
✌
On the right-hand side, we show an example of hierarchical connec-
tors. All interactions containing s and an interaction of γ are possible, i.e.,
{sr1, sr2, sr3, sr1r2, sr1r3, sr2r3, sr1r2r3}. We will use hierarchical connectors to connect the mon-
itor with the instrumented system in an elegant manner (see Sec. 5).
4 A Runtime Enforcement Framework for Component-Based Systems
We propose an abstract runtime enforcement framework specific to CBS. Compared to previous runtime en-
forcement frameworks for monolithic systems, our framework i) takes into account how we instrument CBS
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to incorporate monitors along with their enforcement abilities, and ii) introduces a hierarchy of enforceable
properties. We shall define how properties are specified, what is the hierarchy of enforceable properties for
CBS, what are enforcement monitors, and, what it means for an enforcement monitor to enforce a property.
Preliminaries. We consider that the specification of interest is modeled as a property over an alphabet of
relevant system events Σ. A property Π over Σ is a subset of Σ∗. If a sequence σ belongs to a property Π ,
we note it Π(σ). To evaluate sequences of system events against properties, we shall use the truth-domain
B4 containing the truth values true (⊤), false (⊥), currently true (⊤c), and currently false (⊥c) [7, 8]. Given
a sequence σ ∈ Σ and a property Π ⊆ Σ∗, the evaluation of σ against Π [8] is given by function [[·]]Π
B4
, and
defined as: [[σ]]Π
B4
=


⊤ if Π(σ) ∧ ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : Π(σ · σ′),
⊤c if Π(σ) ∧ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : ¬Π(σ · σ′),
⊥c if ¬Π(σ) ∧ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : Π(σ · σ′),
⊥ if ¬Π(σ) ∧ ∀σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : ¬Π(σ · σ′).
We consider safety properties which specify that nothing bad should ever happen.4 The set of safety
properties over Σ is noted Safety(Σ). Safety properties are the prefix-closed properties of Σ∗: Π ∈
Safety(Σ) iff ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ : Π(σ) =⇒ ∀σ′  σ : Π(σ′). Note, for safety properties, only three truth-
values are needed for the evaluation of sequences with function [[·]]Π
B4
, i.e., ∀Π ∈ Safety(Σ),∀σ ∈ Σ∗ :
[[σ]]Π
B4
∈ {⊥,⊤c,⊤}.
4.1 Specifying Properties of Component-Based Systems [9]
We consider state-based specifications to express desired behaviors. To be general, we only describe the
events of the specification language. We consider events built as Boolean expressions over a set of atomic
propositions. Atomic propositions express conditions on the local information of components. For in-
stance, an atomic proposition can express a condition on the lastly executed port, the current locations
of a components, the values of variables in different components, etc. (e.g., “in component B1, variable
x should be positive if in component B2 variable y is negative”). More formally, an event of π(C) is
defined as a state formula over the atomic propositions expressed on components involved in π(C). Let
AP denote the set of atomic propositions defined with the following grammar (where ∗ ∈ {=,≤}):
Atom ::= cpnt1.var1 ∗ cpnt2.var2 | cpnt.var ∗ a val | cpnt.loc = a loc | cpnt.port = a port
cpnt.var ::= x ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.vars a val ::= v ∈ Data
4 Here, without restriction, we assume that ǫ ∈ Safety(Σ), otherwise enforcement monitors have no chance to enforce the desired
property.
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a loc ::= s ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.locs a port ::= p ∈ ∪i∈[1,n]Bi.ports
An atomic proposition compares the values of some variables, the current location, or the port that is
on the last executed transition. Let Σ denote the set of events defined as Boolean combinations of atomic
propositions. The property Π of interest (over Σ) will be specified through its runtime oracle, a finite-state
machine over Σ (see Sec. 4.3). In the sequel, we suppose that all atomic propositions appearing in the
property affect its truth-value5 We use Prop : Σ → 2AP for the set of atomic propositions used in an
event e ∈ π(C). For ap ∈ Prop(e), used(ap) is the sequence of pairs formed by the components and
the variables (or locations or ports) that are used to define ap. The expression used(ap) is defined using a
pattern-matching as follows:
used(ap) = match(ap) with
| cpnt1.var1 ∗ cpnt2.var2 → (cpnt1, var1) · (cpnt2, var2)
| cpnt.var ∗ val→ (cpnt, var)
| cpnt.loc = a loc→ (cpnt, loc)
| cpnt.port = a port→ (cpnt, port)
4.2 Enforceable Properties on Component-based Systems
Two constraints will delineate the set of enforceable properties:6 k-step tolerance and stutter-invariance.
These constraints will be justified at a technical level in Sec. 5.
k-step tolerance and enforceability. k-step tolerance represents the maximal number of steps for which the
system can deviate from the property and can still roll back. This might be due to the criticality of the system
or the controlability endowed to our enforcement monitors on the system. Moreover, when an enforcement
monitor intervenes in the system (to roll it back to a previous state), it should not destroy any (future) correct
behavior. That is, a monitor has to be able to determine that a deviation is definitive at some point. In other
words, on any execution sequence, if the last events made the property unsatisfied, then after some steps, on
receiving an event the monitor should be able to determine that there is no possible future behavior s.t. the
execution again becomes correct. It is thus legitimate for the monitor to intervene.
5 Otherwise, some simplification of the specification shall be performed beforehand. For instance, such simplification should rule
out events of the form a ∨ ¬a where a ∈ Atom.
6 Contrarily to other runtime enforcement frameworks such as [1, 10], we do not consider specifications over infinite sequences
but finite sequences. It avoids dealing with enforceability issues due to the semantics of the specification formalism (over infinite
sequences, see [11] for a detailed explanation). In that case, for monolithic systems, all properties are enforceable.
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Definition 11 (k-step enforceability). Π is enforceable with k memorization steps, or k-step-enforceable,
if max {|σ| | ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗ : [[σ′]]Π
B4
= ⊤c ∧ ∀σp  σ : [[σ
′ · σp]]
Π
B4
= ⊥c
}
< k. The set of k-step enforceable
properties over Σ is noted Enf (k ,Σ ).
A property Π ⊆ Σ∗ is k-step-enforceable, if the length of its maximal factor σ for which there exists a
sequence σ′ (without the factor) that evaluates to ⊤c and all sequences σ′ · σp obtained by appending a
prefix σp of σ to σ′ evaluate to ⊥c. The constant k additionally represents the maximal “roll-back distance”
of enforcement monitors, i.e., the number of observational steps, an enforcement monitor can revert the
system.
Proposition 1 (A hierarchy of enforceable properties). There exists a hierarchy of enforceable properties
in the sense of Definition 11 where:
1. ∀k, k′ ∈ N : k ≤ k′ =⇒ Enf (k ,Σ ) ⊆ Enf (k ′,Σ );
2. for regular properties, k-step enforceability is decidable.
As the first endeavor in introducing runtime enforcement for CBS, we consider enforcement monitors that
have the ability to memorize one state of the system and thus restore the system up to one observational step
in the past.7
Proposition 2. All safety properties are 1-step-enforceable as per Definition 11: Safety(Σ) ⊆ Enf (1 ,Σ ).
Safety properties are prefix-closed languages. Thus when our monitors detect a deviation from the normal
behavior on one event, it is legitimate for them to intervene because all deviations from the normal behavior
are definitive.
Stutter-invariance. Stutter-invariance [12, 13] is a classical notion of concurrent systems. Imposing stutter-
invariance of specifications stems from how it is required to instrument component-based systems to allow
enforcement monitoring.
As seen in Sec. 4.1, properties are built over atomic propositions which depend on the lastly executed
port, the current location of a component, or the values of variables. Thus our monitor should be able
to observe any change in the system that can impact the satisfaction of an atomic proposition. Since our
monitors should be able to revert the global state of a system one step in the past, and as we shall see in
Sec. 5, instrumenting a transition in a component implies to instrument all transitions synchronized (through
7 The complexity of the instrumentation depends on the number of steps one wants to be able to roll-back the system (see Sec. 5).
Considering more than one step is left for future work.
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a port/interaction) with that transition. This is a consequence of BIP semantics (see Definition 8). Note that,
even if an instrumented transition does not interfere with variables observed by the monitor, it is necessary to
instrument it for recovering purposes. Those transitions might be synchronized with other transitions through
some interactions. In that case, when executing one of these (instrumented) interactions, the monitor receives
the same “event” while the system has not changed. The evaluation of the property w.r.t. the input sequence
of events should not change. Such requirement imposes that the considered properties are stutter-invariant.
Definition 12 (Stutter-invariance [12, 13]). Two sequences of events σ, σ′ ∈ Σ∗ are stutter-equivalent if
there exist a0, . . . , ak ∈ Σ for some k s.t. σ and σ′ belong to the set defined by the regular expression
a+0 · a
+
1 · · · a
+
k . A property Π ⊆ Σ
∗ is stutter-invariant, if for any stutter-equivalent sequences σ, σ′ ∈ Σ∗,
we have (σ ∈ Π and σ′ ∈ Π) or (σ /∈ Π and σ′ /∈ Π).
Based on Proposition 2, we finally consider the set of stutter-invariant safety properties as the enforceable
properties on component-based systems.
Remark 1. Determining whether a property is stutter-invariant is decidable for regular properties using an
automata-based representation [13]. Determining whether a property is a safety property is obviously de-
cidable for regular properties. For these purposes, the automata-based representation of the property is the
monitor.
4.3 Runtime Enforcement for Component-based Systems, at an Abstract Level
We formalize runtime oracles (input to our enforcement framework), enforcement monitors, and how the
latter enforce a property described by a runtime oracle.
Runtime oracle. A runtime oracle is a finite-state machine that consumes events from the system and pro-
duces verdict on each received event.
Definition 13 (Runtime oracle [11]). An oracle O is a tuple 〈ΘO, θO
init
, Σ,−→O,B4, verdict
O
〉
. The finite
set ΘO denotes the control states and θOinit ∈ ΘO is the initial state. The complete function −→O: ΘO×Σ →
ΘO is the transition function. In the following we abbreviate −→O (θ, a) = θ′ by θ a−→O θ′. Function
verdictO : ΘO → B4 is an output function, producing verdicts (i.e., truth-values) in B4 from control states.
Runtime oracles are independent from any formalism used to generate them and are able to check any linear-
time property [8].8 Intuitively, evaluating a property with an oracle works as follows. An execution sequence
8 The runtime oracle to be synthesized from a specification, using some monitor synthesis algorithm. We assume the oracle to be
consistent: in any state, it should evaluate logically-equivalent events in the same way.
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is processed in a lock-step manner. On each received event, the oracle produces an appraisal on the sequence
read so far. For the formal semantics of the oracle and a formal definition of sequence checking, we refer
to [8]. Figure 2 shows an example of a runtime oracle that observes e∗1 · e∗2, where e1 (resp. e2) denotes that
the variable x in component comp1 is strictly positive (resp. strictly negative).
⊤c ⊤c
⊥
comp1 .x < 0
comp1 .x < 0comp1 .x > 0
comp1 .x = 0 comp1 .x ≥ 0
Fig. 2: Runtime oracle
Enforcement Monitor. An enforcement monitor (EM) is a finite-state machine
that transforms a sequence of events from the program to one that evaluates on
“good verdicts” of the oracle. The remaining description of the EM and how it
interacts with the system serves as an abstract description of our instrumentation
of CBS in Sec. 5. Compared to enforcement monitors proposed in the literature,
the ones introduced in this paper feature the ability to emit cancellation events to revert the system back to
a state where the underlying property is satisfied.
Definition 14 (Enforcement monitor). The enforcement monitor associated to the runtime oracle O =
〈
ΘO, θO
init
, Σ,−→O,B4, verdict
O
〉
is a tuple E =
〈
ΘE , θO
init
, Σ ∪Σ,−→E
〉
where:
– ΘE ⊆ ΘO ∪Θ
O
with ΘO =
{
θe | e ∈ Σ ∧ θ ∈ Θ
O
}
s.t. ΘE is reachable from θOinit with −→E ,
– Σ = {e | e ∈ Σ} is the set of cancellation events,
– −→E is the transition function defined as −→E=
{
〈θ, e, θ′〉 ∈−→O| verdict
O(θ′) ∈ {⊤,⊤c}
}
∪
{
〈θ, e, θe〉 , 〈θe, e, θ〉 | ∃θ
′ ∈ Θ : 〈θ, e, θ′〉 ∈−→O ∧ verdict
O(θ′) = ⊥
}
.
Intuitively, an enforcement monitor follows the structure of a runtime oracle on currently-good and good
locations. For each transition 〈θ, e, θ′〉 leading to a “bad” location θ′ (verdictO(θ′) = ⊥), the transition
relation is modified in that we add a transition 〈θ, e, θe〉 leading to a fresh intermediate state θe and a tran-
sition 〈θe, e, θ〉 back to the starting state θ labelled by the corresponding cancellation event. Note, −→E is
complete w.r.t. Σ.
We define the composition of a system with an enforcement monitor.
Definition 15 (Composition of a system with an enforcement monitor). Given a system whose behavior
can be formalized by an LTS L = 〈Σ′,Loc,Trans〉 over the alphabet Σ′, with Trans ⊆ Loc × Σ × Loc,
and an enforcement monitor E =
〈
ΘO ∪Θ
O
, θOinit, Σ ∪Σ,−→E
〉
with Σ ⊆ Σ′ and Σ ∩ Σ′ = ∅ for a
safety property where states in ΘO are associated to currently good and good verdicts, the composition is
the LTS
〈
Loc× (ΘO ∪Θ
O
), Σ ∪Σ,Mon
〉
, noted L ⊗ EM , where the transition relation Mon ⊆ Loc×
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(ΘO ∪Θ
O
)×Σ ∪Σ × Loc× (ΘO ∪Θ
O
) is defined by the two following semantics rules:
q
e′
−→Trans q
′ e′ ∈ Σ′ \Σ
〈q, θ〉
e
−→Mon
〈
q′, θ
〉 (1)
θ
e
−→E θ
′ θ′ ∈ ΘO q
e
−→Trans q
′ e ∈ Σ
〈q, θ〉
e
−→Mon
〈
q′, θ′
〉 (2)
θ
e
−→E θe θe ∈ Θ
O
θe
e
−→O θ q
e
−→Trans q
′
〈q, θ〉
e·e
−→Mon 〈q, θ〉
(3)
At runtime, an enforcement monitor executes in a lock step manner with the system. When the system emits
an event that is not in the alphabet of interest of the enforcement monitor (i.e., an event e′ ∈ Σ′ \ Σ), the
enforcement monitors lets the system execute without intervening (first semantics rule). When the system
emits an event that leads to a currently-good or good location, the enforcement monitor simply follows the
system (second semantics rule). When the system emits an event that leads to a bad location according to the
oracle, the enforcement monitor executes a cancellation event. In the third semantics rule, state q′ is called
an unstable state: it is a state where the system never actually stays in because the enforcement monitor
inserts immediately a cancellation event. During an execution inserting the event e “reverts” the effect of
the event e on the system: after an execution sequence σ ∈ Σ∗, for any event e ∈ Σ and its associated
cancellation event e ∈ Σ, the sequence σ · e · e “amounts” to the sequence σ. More formally, we define a
function controlled between sequences of (Σ ∪Σ)∗ and sequences of Σ∗, inductively as follows:
– controlled(ǫ) = ǫ,
– controlled(σ · e) = τ · e if controlled(σ) = τ and e ∈ Σ,
– controlled(σ · e · e) = τ if controlled(σ) = τ , e ∈ Σ, and e ∈ Σ.
Not all sequences in (Σ ∪Σ)∗ are in relation with a sequence in Σ∗ but the traces of an LTS composed with
an enforcement monitor are.
Given a system emitting events over Σ and a safety property over Σ. Consider the composition of
the enforcement monitor (obtained from the property) and the system. Any execution of the composition
projected on Σ′ deviates from the property by at most 1 event before being corrected, as stated by the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given a safety property Π ∈ Safety(Σ), its enforcement monitor as per Definition 14 (built
from the associated runtime oracle), and a system whose behavior can be modeled by an LTS L, we have:
1. ∀σ ∈ traces(L⊗ EM) : (controlled(σ) /∈ Π ∧ ∃e ∈ Σ,∃τ ∈ Σ∗ : σ = τ · e) =⇒ τ ∈ Π ,
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2. ∀σ ∈ traces(L⊗ EM) : controlled(σ) ∈ Π ∩ traces(L) .
Item 1 states that the incorrect monitored traces that terminate with an event in Σ (i.e., the traces that have
not been corrected by enforcement monitors) have their longest maximal strict prefix correct w.r.t. Π . Item
2 states that the sequences associated to the monitored traces via function controlled are i) correct w.r.t. Π
and ii) belong to the original LTS.
5 Runtime Enforcement for BIP Systems
We instrument and integrate a runtime oracle O =
〈
ΘO, θOinit, Σ,−→O,B4, verdict
O
〉
for some (enforce-
able) property into a BIP system (π(Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn})),
〈
l10, . . . , l
n
0
〉 )
made of a composite component
π(Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn})), where the initial locations of the atomic components B1, . . . , Bn are l10, . . . , ln0 , re-
spectively. Some of the transformations proposed in this section are defined w.r.t. a particular component in
the system. For this purpose, we consider an atomic component B =
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉 (cf.
Definition 2).
5.1 Analysis and Extraction of the Needed Information
The first step is to retrieve from the runtime oracle the set of components and their corresponding variables
that should be monitored. For a property expressed over Σ(π(Γ ({B1, . . . , Bn}))) and its oracle:
– mon vars(Bi) is the set of variables used in the property (that should be monitored) related to compo-
nent Bi, formally mon vars(Bi)
def
= {Bi.x | ∃e ∈ Σ,∃ap ∈ Prop(e) : (Bi, x) ∈ used(ap)},
– occur is the set of all monitored variables, formally occur def=
⋃
i∈[1,n]mon vars(Bi).
For instance for the property described by the runtime oracle in Fig. 2, we have mon vars(comp1 ) =
{comp1 .x}.
5.2 Instrumenting Transitions
To instrument the system in such a way that enforcement is as efficient as possible, we should only instru-
ment the transitions that may modify some monitored variables. We denote by select trans(B) the set of
the transitions that should be instrumented in B. A transition is instrumented if either: (1) it modifies some
monitored variables through its sequence of assignments; or (2) some monitored variables are assigned to
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its port. Note that, if the property contains a predicate on the location or on a port of a component B (e.g., if
B.loc = l0 appears in the property), then all transitions of that component should be instrumented. Formally:
select trans(B)
def
=


B.trans if {B.loc, B.port} ∩mon vars(B) 6= ∅,
{τ ∈ B.trans | mon vars(B) ∩ (var(τ.func) ∪ τ.port .vars) 6= ∅} otherwise.
For the component in Fig. 1, we have select trans(comp1 ) = {(l, p, x > 0, [y := x+ t], l′)} since variable
x is both attached to port p and comp1 .x ∈ mon vars(comp1 ).
Instrumenting a transition consists in splitting it into four transitions as follows. First, we reconstruct
the initial transition. Second, we create a transition to interact with the enforcement monitor through port
pm. Finally, we create two transitions: one to recover (through port pr) when the property is violated and
another to continue (through port pc) otherwise. In case of recovery, the modified variables are restored. The
ports pm, pr, pc are special, their purpose will be detailed in Sec. 5.3. Formally, instrumenting a transition is
defined by function inst trans that takes a transition and returns a set of four transitions as follows.
Definition 16 (Instrumenting a transition). For any transition τ = 〈l, g, p, f, l′〉 in T , inst trans(τ) =
{
τ i, τm, τ c, τ r
}
, where:
– τ i =
〈
l, g, p, f i, lm
〉
, where:
f i =


f if Bi.loc /∈ mon vars(Bi) ∧Bi.port /∈ mon vars(Bi),
f ; [loc := “l′”] if Bi.loc ∈ mon vars(Bi) ∧Bi.port /∈ mon vars(Bi),
f ; [port := “p”] if Bi.loc /∈ mon vars(Bi) ∧Bi.port ∈ mon vars(Bi),
f ; [loc := “l′”; port := “p”] if Bi.loc ∈ mon vars(Bi) ∧Bi.port ∈ mon vars(Bi),
– τm = 〈lm, true, p
m, [ ], lr〉,
– τ c = 〈lr, true, p
c, [ ], l′〉,
– τ r = 〈lr, true, p
r, f r, l〉, where f r = [x1 := xtmp1 ; . . . ;xj := x
tmp
j ] with {x1, . . . , xj} =
{x | x ∈ p.vars ∨ x := fx(X) ∈ f}.
Example 2 (Instrumenting a transition). Figure 3 shows how the transition, in red in Fig. 1, is instrumented.
On recovery, we restore all the variables that are modified when executing that transition. Recall that some
of the variables could be modified indirectly through the port of the transition (p), e.g., x and z.
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Recall that an interaction synchronizes a set of transitions and its execution implies firing all its correspond-
ing transitions. Hence, recovering implies to restore the previous global state of the system. For this purpose,
instrumenting a transition τ ∈ select trans(Bi) implies the instrumentation of all transitions synchronizing
with τ through an interaction. We define rec trans to be the set of all transitions that should be instrumented.
We also define rec comp to be the set of components that contain at least one instrumented transition, and
rec inter to be the set of connectors synchronizing on at least one instrumented transition. Formally:
rec trans-i
def
= ∪i∈[1,n] select trans(Bi),
rec trans
def
= rec trans-i∪{τ | ∃γ ∈ Γ,∃τk ∈ rec trans-i : {τ.port , τk.port} ⊆ Pγ} ,
rec comp
def
= {Bi | Bi.T ∩ rec trans 6= ∅} ,
rec inter
def
= {a ∈ Γ | ∃τ ∈ rec trans : τ.port ∈ Pγ} .
5.3 Instrumenting Atomic Components
Let T rB = rec trans∩B.trans be the set of transitions that should be instrumented in B (noted T r when
clear from context). We create new temporary/recovery variables used to store the values of the variables
that could be modified on an instrumented transition. More precisely, for each variable that can be modified
through a function or attached to a port of an instrumented transition, we create a corresponding temporary
variable for it. Given a set of transitions, we define the set of variables that should be recovered as follows:
rec vars(T ′)
def
=
⋃
τ∈T ′ τ.port .vars ∪ var(τ.func). If the enforcement monitor needs to observe the location
or the port being executed, we create two new variables9 port and loc that store the name of the next location
and the name of the port being executed. We create three new ports:
1. pm is used to send the value of the monitored variables to the enforcement monitor;
2. pc is used to receive a continue notification from the enforcement monitor;
3. pr is used to receive a recovery notification from the enforcement monitor.
Finally, we split each of its instrumented transitions, that is T r, according to Definition 16, and we create
new locations accordingly. Formally, instrumenting an atomic component is defined as follows:
9 Variables created by the transformations have fresh name w.r.t. existing variables of the input system.
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Definition 17 (Instrumenting an atomic component). We define the instrumentation function inst that
transforms an input atomic component:
inst(B) =


B if B /∈ rec comp,
〈
P inst, Linst, T inst,X inst, {gτ}τ∈T inst , {fτ}τ∈T inst
〉
otherwise.
where:
– X inst = X∪{v | Bi .v ∈ mon vars(Bi)}∪{x
tmp | x ∈ rec vars(T r)} where, ifBi.loc ∈ mon vars(Bi)
(resp. Bi.port ∈ mon vars(Bi)), loc (resp. port ) is initialized to li0 (resp. null), recovery/temporary
variables are initialized to the values of their corresponding variables,
– P inst = P ∪ {〈pm,mon vars(Bi)〉 , 〈p
c, ∅〉 , 〈pr, ∅〉},
– Linst = L ∪ {lmτ | τ ∈ T
r} ∪ {lrτ | τ ∈ T
r},
– T inst = (T \ T r) ∪ (
⋃
τ∈T r inst trans(τ)).
z
yytmp
ztmp t
lrlm
true
l
[y := x+ t]
p
x > 0
[ ]
pm
[ ]
pc
true
[x := xtmp; y := ytmp; z := ztmp]
true
pr
l′
q
l′′
q pmp pc pr
x xtmp
Fig. 3: Instrumenting an atomic component
Example 3 (Instrumenting an atomic component). Figure 3 shows the instrumentation of the atomic com-
ponent in Fig. 1. Note that only the transition in red is instrumented. Also, the variables attached to port pm
(i.e., only comp1 .x in this example) are those extracted from the oracle (see Fig. 2), i.e., monitored variables
of that component. Moreover, the function of the recovery transition (i.e., labelled with with pr) recovers
the variables that could be modified, i.e., x, y, and z since variables x and z are attached to port p and y is
assigned on the transition.
In the sequel, we consider an instrumented atomic component Binst = inst(B). After instrumenting an
atomic component, we must also create a backup of the variables that could be modified after executing
an instrumented transition. That is, we need to store the values of those variables in their corresponding
temporary variables. For each transition, we select all the transitions of the next state that are instrumented,
and we backup the variables that could be modified on them.
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l0
p
q
pm pc
pm pc
pr[z := ztmp]
pr[x := xtmp]
[ztmp := z; xtmp := x]
[ztmp := z; xtmp := x]
Fig. 4: Injecting backup into an atomic component.
Definition 18 (Backup injection). The backup injection function inj applied to Binst is the composite com-
ponent inj(Binst) = Brec =
〈
P inst, Linst, T rec,X inst, {gτ}τ∈T rec , {fτ}τ∈T rec
〉
, where:
T rec =
{〈
l, g, p, f ; [xtmp1 := x1; . . . ;x
tmp
j := xj ], l
′
〉
| τ = 〈l, g, p, f, l′〉 ∈ T inst ∧ {x1, . . . , xj} = rec vars(
{
τ i ∈ Binst.T r | τ i.src = l′ ∧ τ i.port ∈ P
}
)
}
.
In the sequel, we consider an atomic component with injected backup Brec = inj(Binst).
Example 4 (Backup injection). Figure 4 shows an example of backup injection (depicted in blue), into an
instrumented atomic component. Variables x and z are backed up on any transition entering l0 because there
are two outgoing transitions from l0 that modify variables x and z.
5.4 Creating a BIP Enforcement Monitor from an Oracle
We present how a runtime oracle O is transformed into a BIP enforcement monitor E that mimics the behav-
ior of the enforcement monitor associate to O (see Definitions 13 and 14). The generated BIP enforcement
monitor receives events from the instrumented atomic components and processes them to produce the same
verdicts as the initial abstract oracle. Depending on the state of E , it notifies the instrumented atomic com-
ponents to continue or to recover. The enforcement monitor contains a copy of the monitored variables and
a backup/temporary copy of them. When the instrumented system executes an interaction that synchronizes
at least one instrumented transition, it interacts with the enforcement monitor through port pm and sends
the modified values of monitored variables. Depending on those values the enforcement monitor produces
a verdict and notifies the original system to continue or to recover, accordingly. In case of recovery (resp.
continue), the supervised system should also recover (resp. backup) its monitored variables. The behavior
of the enforcement monitor is formalized as follows.
Definition 19 (Building an enforcement monitor). From oracle O we define the enforcement monitor
E =
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
as an atomic component:
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– X = occur∪Xtmp with Xtmp = {xtmp | x ∈ occur},
– P = {〈pm, occur〉 , 〈pc, ∅〉 , 〈pr, ∅〉},
– L = L⊤ ∪ Lm with L⊤ =
{
q | q ∈ ΘO ∧ verdictO(q) ∈ {⊤,⊤c}
}
and Lm =
{
qm | q ∈ L⊤
}
,
– T = Tm ∪ T r ∪ T c with
• Tm =
{
〈q, pm, true, [ ], qm〉 | q ∈ L⊤
}
;
• T c =
{
〈qm, pc, e, f c, q′〉 | q
e
−→O q
′ ∧ verdictO(q′) = ⊤
}
, where f c = [xtmp1 := x1; . . . ;x
tmp
j =
xj ] with
〈
xtmp1 , . . . , x
tmp
j
〉
= Xtmp;
• T r =
{
〈qm, pr, e, f r, q〉 | q
e
−→O q
′ ∧ verdictO(q′) = ⊥
}
, where f r = [x1 := xtmp1 ; . . . ;xj :=
xtmpj ] with
〈
xtmp1 , . . . , x
tmp
j
〉
= Xtmp.
Example 5 (Building an enforcement monitor). Figure 5 depicts the enforcement monitor in BIP generated
from the runtime oracle in Fig. 2. From the initial state, the enforcement monitor synchronizes with the
system by receiving the value of comp1 .x through port pm. Then, depending on the value of comp1 .x , it
either recovers (when comp1 .x is equal to 0, or continues otherwise. In case of continue, variable comp1 .x
is backed up. In case of recovery, variable comp1 .x is recovered.
5.5 Integration - Spin Recovery
We define the connection between the instrumented atomic components π(Γ ({Brec1 , . . . , Brecn })) and en-
forcement monitor E . We connect the pm ports of the instrumented components with the pm port of E (γm).
All the ports of that connector should be trigger to make all interactions possible. Because of maximal
progress, all the enabled pm ports of the instrumented components will be synchronized with the port pm
of E . The update function of that connector transfers the updated values of the monitored variables from the
instrumented atomic components to E .
comp1.x = 0
pm pc prcomp1.xcomp1.x
tmp
pm [comp1.x
tmp := comp1.x]
pc
comp1.x < 0[comp1.x
tmp := comp1.x] [comp1.x
tmp := comp1.x]
comp1.x ≥ 0
pr
pm
pc
comp1.x < 0
[comp1.x := comp1.x
tmp]
pr
pc
comp1.x > 0
[comp1.x := comp1.x
tmp]
Fig. 5: Enforcement monitor
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Then, we connect all the continue ports of the instrumented atomic components, i.e. pc, with a connector
where its ports are marked as trigger. This connector will be connected hierarchically to the port pc of E .
The ports of the hierarchical connector are marked as synchron so that the synchronization between the pc
port of the instrumented components requires the port pc of E to be enabled. This is necessary because the
instrumented components will be ready to execute both the continue and the recoverable ports based on the
decision taken by E . In the same way, we connect the recoverable ports.
Finally, the priority model is augmented by giving more priority to the interactions defined by the moni-
tored, continue, and recoverable connections. Modifying the priority model ensures that, after the execution
of an interaction synchronizing some instrumented transition, E notifies the system to recover or to continue
before involving other interactions synchronizing instrumented transitions.
Note that, when some of the ports pm of the instrumented atomic components are enabled, the port pm
of E is also enabled. However, the instrumented atomic components could be in a state where none of their
pm ports are enabled. To prevent E from moving without synchronizing with the components, the port pm
of E is synchron.
Definition 20 (Integration - spin recovery). The composite component is πrec(Γ rec(Brec1 , . . . , Brecn , E)),
where:
– Γ rec = Γ ∪ {γm, γc1 , γc2 , γr1 , γr2}, where:
• γm = 〈Pγm , tγm , true, Fγm〉, where:
∗ Pγm = {〈Bi.pm,mon vars(Bi)〉}Bi∈rec comp ∪ {E .p
m}, tγm(E .pm) = false and ∀p ∈ Pγm \
{E .pm} : tγm(p) = true,
∗ Fγm , the update function, is the identity data transfer from the variables in the ports of the
interacting components to the corresponding variables in the oracle port.
• γc1 = 〈Pγc1 , tγc1 , true, [ ]〉, γ
c2 = 〈Pγc2 , tγc2 , true, [ ]〉, where:
∗ Pγc1 = {〈Bi.p
c, ∅〉}Bi∈rec comp and ∀p ∈ Pγc1 : tγc1 (p) = true,
∗ Pγc2 = {γ
c1 .export , E .pc} and tγc2 (γc1 .export) = tγc2 (E .pc) = false.
• γr1 = 〈Pγr1 , tγr1 , true, [ ]〉 , γ
r2 = 〈Pγr2 , tγr2 , true, [ ]〉, where:
∗ Pγr1 = {〈Bi.p
r, ∅〉}Bi∈rec comp and ∀p ∈ Pγr1 : tγr1 (Bi.p
r) = true,
∗ Pγr2 = {γ
r1 .export , E .pr} and tγr2 (γr1 .export) = tγr2 (E .pr) = false,
– πrec = π ∪ {〈a, a′〉 | a ∈ ∪γ∈rec interI(γ) ∧ a
′ ∈ I(γm, γc1 , γc2 , γr1 , γr2)}.
An example of integration with spin recovery is provided in the following sub-section.
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Remark 2. If the system reaches a state, where no further transition is possible, the supervised system will
enter in a livelock as all transitions will be tried and rolled back indefinitely.
5.6 Integration - With Disabler
The instrumented system defined above may be inefficient in some cases. For instance, when E notifies the
system to recover, the system may execute again one of the previously executed bad interactions. To solve
this issue, we create a disabler component that comes as an optimization for the monitored system. The
idea is to keep disabled the bad interactions that we have recovered from, until a good interaction is found
(note: the system should contain at least one possible good interaction, which can possibly be taken after
recovering, if no good interaction exists then the system would reach a deadlock state after the system has
exhausted all available interactions). For this purpose, we assume that all connectors of the input BIP system
contain only synchron ports, hence each connector represents only one interaction. In the following, we use
the terms connector and interaction interchangeably.
For each interaction (a ∈ rec inter) connected to an instrumented transition, we associate a transition in
the disabler. This transition will be labeled with a port connected to the interaction that corresponds to that
transition. That is, to execute that interaction, the port of the corresponding transition of the disabler should
be ready as well. On executing that interaction the id representing the interaction is sent to the disabler.
We also create a continue port pc and a recoverable port pr that will be synchronized with E in case of
continue and recovery, respectively. The disabler synchronizes with E on the recovery and continue ports.
On a recovery, E synchronizes with the instrumented components and with the disabler. The disabler will
set the guard of the corresponding last received id to false. Consequently, after recovery, the last executed
interaction cannot not be taken again. On continue, E informs the disabler that it should enable all its ports,
by re-setting their corresponding guards to true, and now all interactions become valid. For each recoverable
interaction, i.e., a ∈ rec inter we assign a positive integer for it: index : rec inter → [0, | rec inter | − 1].
Definition 21 (Disabler construction in BIP). Given the set of recoverable interactions rec inter we con-
struct the disabler D =
〈
P,L, T,X, {gτ}τ∈T , {fτ}τ∈T
〉
, where:
– P = {pr} ∪ {pc} ∪ {〈pγ , ∅〉 | γ ∈ rec inter},
– L = {l},
– X = {enab, id}, where enab is an array of Booleans initialized to true and its size is equal to
| rec inter |,
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– T = T r ∪ T c ∪ T inter, where:
• T r = {τ r}, where τ r =
〈
l, true, pr,
[
enab[id] := false
]
, l
〉
,
• T c = {τ c}, where τ c =
〈
l, true, pc,
[
enab[0] := true; . . . ; enab[| rec inter | − 1] := true
]
, l
〉
,
• T inter = {〈l, enab[index(γ)], pγ , [id := index(γ)], l〉 | γ ∈ rec inter}.
Example 6 (Disabler). Figure 6 provides an example of disabler in blue. We have rec inter = {a0, a1}
(a0 and a1 contain ports that are attached to instrumented transitions). The disabler contains transitions that
correspond to a0 and a1. Those transitions are labeled with ports pa0 , pa1 which are connected to interactions
a0 and a1. Moreover, the disabler contains an array of Boolean variables of size 2. The transitions that
correspond to rec inter are guarded with the elements of the array accordingly. In case of recovery, e.g.,
after executing a0 (resp. a1), the corresponding Boolean variable is set to false, and hence, interaction a0
(resp. a1) is disabled. In case of continue, all the elements of the array are set to true.
As in Definition 20, we connect the instrumented system with E , but we also connect the instrumented
interactions to their corresponding ports of the disabler. Moreover, we connect the continue port (resp. the
recovery port) of E with the continue port (resp. the recovery port) of the disabler. As in Definition 20, we
augment the priority model.
Definition 22 (Integration - with disabler). Given an enforcement monitor in BIP E and a composite
component π(Γ ({Brec1 , . . . , Brecn })) obtained as in Definition 20, that is,Breci = inj(inst(Bm1 )), and disabler
D, we build the composite component πrec(Γ rec(Brec1 , . . . , Brecn , E ,D)), where,
– Γ rec = (Γ \ rec inter) ∪ Γ rec inter ∪ {γm, γc1 , γc2 , γr1 , γr2},
• Γ rec inter =
{
γrec inter = (Pγrec inter , tγrec inter , Gγ , Fγ)
}
γ=(Pγ ,tγ ,Gγ ,Fγ)∈rec inter
where Pγrec inter =
Pγ ∪ {p
γ | pγ ∈ γ ∈ rec inter} and ∀p ∈ Pγrec inter : tγrec inter(p) = false;
• γm = (Pγm , tγm , true, Fγm) , with
∗ Pγm = {〈Bi.p
m,mon vars(Bi)〉}Bi∈rec comp ∪ {E .p
m},
∗ tγm(E .p
m) = false, and ∀p ∈ Pγm \ {E .pm} : tγm(p) = true;
∗ Fγm , the update function, is the identity data transfer from the variables in the ports of the
interacting components Bi (i ∈ [1, n]) to the corresponding variables in the oracle port;
• γc1 = (Pγc1 , tγc1 , true, [ ]), γ
c2 = (Pγc2 , tγc2 , true, [ ]), with
∗ Pγc1 = {〈Bi.p
c, ∅〉}Bi∈rec comp and ∀p ∈ Pγc1 : tγc1 (p) = true;
∗ Pγc2 = {γ
c1 .export , E .pc,D.pc} and ∀p ∈ Pγc1 : tγc2 (p) = false;
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Fig. 6: Supervised system [with/without] disabler (spin recovery – without disabler).
• γr1 = (Pγr1 , tγr1 , true, [ ]), γ
r2 = (Pγr2 , tγr2 , true, [ ]), with
∗ Pγr1 = {〈Bi.p
r, ∅〉}Bi∈rec comp and ∀p ∈ Pγr1 : tγr1 (p) = true;
∗ Pγr2 = {γ
r1 .export , E .pr,D.pr} and ∀p ∈ Pγr2 : tγr2 (p) = false;
– πrec = π ∪ {〈a, a′〉 | a ∈ ∪γ∈rec interI(γ) ∧ a
′ ∈ I(γm) ∪ I(γc1) ∪ I(γc2) ∪ I(γr1) ∪ I(γr2)}.
Example 7 (Integration - With Disabler). Figure 6 shows the supervised system with E and D. In case of
spin recovery, we do not include D and its connections. In this example, we assume that the monitored
variables are modified only when executing interactions a0 and a1. Consequently, component B3 remains
unchanged. Notice that the expressiveness and modularity of BIP design allows us to add and remove D
without modifying the behaviors of components.
Remark 3. If the system reaches a state, where no further transition is possible, it will enter in a deadlock as
all transitions will be tried, rolled back, and disabled successively by the disabler.
5.7 On the Correctness and Behavior of the Supervised System
Correctly observing the system behavior relies on our instrumentation technique and follows the same cor-
rectness arguments as in [9]. Correctness of the whole approach stems from the facts that we consider safety
properties and that, as it was similarly expressed at an abstract level in Proposition 3, our enforcement
monitors roll-back the system by one step as soon as the system emits an event that violates the property.
Intuitively, the correctness proof of the transformations consists in showing that the supervised BIP
system behaves in the same way as the composition of an abstract enforcement monitor with the LTS of the
initial system. That is, the behavior of the supervised systems follows the semantics rules in Definition 15.
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Preliminaries. A run of length l of a system (B, Init) whose runtime semantics is π(C) = (Q,A,−→pi) is
the sequence of alternating states/configurations and interactions q0 · a0 · q1 · a1 · · · al−1 · ql such that: q0 =
Init , and, ∀i ∈ [0, l − 1] : qi ∈ Q ∧ ∃ai ∈ A : qi
ai−→pi q
i+1
.
Following the transformations defined in Sec. 5, a run r = q0 · a0 · q1 · a1 · · · al−1 · ql of the monitored
system Crec satisfies the following properties:
– if E .pm ∈ ai, then all other ports involved in ai are pm ports. The same property applies to E .pc and
E .pr. We denote by αm (resp. αc, αr) any interactions involving E .pm (resp. E .pc, E .pr). This holds by
construction according to Definitions 20 and 22.
– Let i ∈ [1,m] s.t. qi · ai · qi+1, then E .pm ∈ ai iff qi+1 · ai+1 · qi+2 where {E .pr, E .pc} ∩ ai+1 6= ∅.
This stems from the following facts: (1) according to Definitions 20 and 22, αc and αr interactions
have more priority than the interactions of the initial BIP system, and (2) according to Definition 16, an
instrumented transition of an atomic component consists of a recovery and continue transitions just after
a transition for interacting with the monitor (i.e., labeled with port pm).
Given a run q0 · a0 · q1 · a1 · · · al−1 · ql of the supervised system. Let us consider the next step of the system
which consists in performing an interaction a. We distinguish two cases according to whether a is connected
to an instrumented transition (i.e., a ∈ rec inter) or not:
1. If a /∈ rec inter, then the execution of a does not modify any variable of the property. This stems
from the fact that: (1) according to Definitions 20 and 22, αm interaction has more priority than the
interactions of the initial BIP system, and (2) according to Definition 16, an instrumented transition of
an atomic component consists of its previous transition followed by a transition to interaction with the
monitor (i.e., labeled with port pm). This is mapped to an event e′ ∈ Σ′\Σ in correspond to rule number
1 in Definition 7.
2. If a ∈ rec inter, then a is followed by the execution of a αm interaction (i.e., interacting with the
enforcement monitor). The values of the variables sent through the port pm of the enforcement monitor
(i.e. E .pm) is mapped to a event e ∈ Σ in Definition 7. In that case, we distinguish two sub-cases:
(a) When a involves transitions that do not modify the variables of the property but at least one of these
transitions has a port in an interaction that modifies certain variables of the property. Henceforth,
e corresponds to the last emitted event in the run. Because of stutter invariance, the system keeps
satisfying the property. This situation corresponds to rule number 2 in Definition 7.
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(b) When a involves transitions that modify some variables of the property, we distinguish two more
sub-cases.
i. When e brings the monitor to a good (with verdict ⊤) or currently good state (with verdict ⊤c),
the system execute an αc interaction that moves the system to a next good state (the same as in
the original system). This situation also corresponds to rule number 2 in Definition 7.
ii. When e brings the monitor to a bad state (with verdict ⊥), the system execute an αr interaction
that restores the values of the variables and brings the system to its previous state which was
correct. The execution of recovery corresponds to e in rule number 3 in Definition 7.
Notice that, if added, the disabler D might disable an interaction that violates the property and the scheduler
would select the next one in terms of priority. For example, consider a composite component with two
interactions a0 and a1 such that a0 has more priority than a1. If a0 is always enabled, then according to the
BIP semantics a1 could not be enabled. However, in the supervised system, if a0 leads to a bad state, D
will disable that interaction. Consequently, interaction a1 becomes enabled. This can be seen as a powerful
primitive to enforce the correctness of a system by allowing low priority interactions. However, in some
cases, a property should be enforced while preserving the priority model. In that case, on recovery, D must
disable all interactions with less priority than the last executed one.
5.8 Summary
From the abstract oracle we generate the corresponding enforcement monitor in BIP. The instrumented
system interacts with the enforcement monitor to avoid bad behaviors. The main idea of our method is
to recover the system when the enforcement monitor detects a bad state. The recovering process is done as
follows: (1) If the execution of an interaction modifies some monitored variables, the system should send the
updated variable values to the enforcement monitor; (2) Depending on those values, the enforcement monitor
interacts with the system and lets it continue or makes it recover the last correct state. After recovery, the
system may take again the last executed interaction which will lead again to a bad state. Such situation
may lead the system to loop infinitely (livelock). To prevent this, we define a disabler component which is
notified of a recovery to disable the bad interaction, until a good interaction is found.
27
❝ ✁✂✄✁☎✆r✆❝ ✝✆r✞
❉✟✠✡☛☞✌✍
✎✏✑✒✓✑✔✕✖✕✎✏✗✕✖✘
♠✏✑✓✒✏✖
✎✏✑✒✓✑✔✕✖✕✎✏✗✕✖✘
♠✏✑✓✒✏✖
❊✙✚✛✜✢✣✤✣✙✥
▼✛✙✦✥✛✜
❊✙✚✛✜✢✣✤✣✙✥
▼✛✙✦✥✛✜
■✧★✩✪✫✬★✭✮✧
❇✯✰ ✰✱✲✳✱✴✵
✶✷✸✹✺✸✻✼✽✼✶✷✾✼✽✿
❀❁❂✴❃❄❅✱
❙✩★ ✮❆
❘✩❈✮❋✩✫✬●❍✩
❚✫✬✧❏✭★✭✮✧❏
■✧❏★✫❑▲✩✧★✩✫
◆✫✩✬★✭✮✧
❖✭❏✬●❍✩✫
✶✷✸✹✺✸✻✼✽✼✶✷✾✼✽✿
P✷✸✺✹✷✽
◗❯❱❲ ❳✭❍✩
❘❑✧★✭▲✩ ❨✫✬❈❍✩
❩✧❆✮✫❈✩▲✩✧★ ❱✮✧✭★✮✫
◆✫✩✬★✭✮✧
❬❭❪✲✱❫❅✵❅❭❴
❵✲❭❁❴✲✱
❛✧✬❍❜❏✭❏
Fig. 7: Toolset for runtime enforcement (RE-BIP)
6 Implementation and Evaluation
This section presents RE-BIP (see Sec. 6.1), an implementation of the transformations presented in Sec. 5,
and its evaluation on two case studies: deadlock avoidance for dining philosphers (see Sec. 6.2) and correct
placement of robots (see Sec. 6.3)
6.1 RE-BIP: a Toolset for Runtime Enforcement of BIP Systems
RE-BIP10 is a Java implementation (8,000 LOC) of the transformations described in Sec. 5, and, is part of
the BIP distribution. RE-BIP takes as input a BIP system and an abstract oracle (an XML file) and then
outputs a new BIP system whose behavior is supervised at runtime (see Fig. 7). RE-BIP uses the following
modules (see Fig. 7):
– Analysis: from the runtime oracle of the property, collect the variables that should be monitored;
– Instrumentation: according to the analysis, instrument some of the atomic components;
10 http://ujf-aub.bitbucket.org/re-bip/
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Fig. 8: Dining philosophers with possible deadlock
– Enforcement Monitor Creation: from the runtime oracle (given as an XML file), generate the corre-
sponding enforcement monitor in BIP;
– Integration: according to the user’s input, create the supervised system with or without the disabler.
6.2 Using RE-BIP to Avoid Deadlocks
We have modeled in BIP some dining philosophers that may deadlock. We aim to enforce deadlock freedom
at runtime. Figure 8(a) (resp. 8(b)) models the behavior of a philosopher (resp. fork) in BIP. Figure 8(c)
shows a composite system consisting of two philosophers and two forks. The system enters a deadlock state
if all philosophers are in state r. In that case, the system should recover. In Figures 9(a), 9(b) we show some
experimental results. We increase the number of philosophers and compare the execution before and after
the transformation (with and without disabler). The x-axis represents the number of philosophers (and also
the number of forks). The y-axis represents the execution time. We ran the initial BIP system, which may
deadlock, several times up to reach 10, 000 steps (i.e., 10, 000 releases of the fork). We ran 10, 000 steps
of the supervised BIP system (with and without the disabler). Our results show that the supervised system
introduces a reasonable overhead (e.g., 4% in case of 900 philosophers with disabler). In this example, en-
abling the disabler, does not introduce deadlocks (there is always at least one good interaction after recovery,
a philosopher with a fork on its right can take the fork on its left), and reduces significantly the overhead.
6.3 Using RE-BIP to Control Robots
Figure 10 shows a robotic system modeled in BIP. We consider three robots (referred to as Ri, i ∈ [1, 3])
placed on maps of size n × n with n ∈ [2, 5, 100]. A robot can move up, down, left, and right. Each robot
Ri has a local controller Ci that synchronizes with the robot to start and stop the robot. When a robot starts,
it randomly moves 1, 000 steps. The system contains also a global controller C that synchronizes with local
controllers to count the number of active robots. This model allows collisions between robots. To avoid this,
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Fig. 9: Performance evaluation of dining philosophers
the system must satisfy the following invariant11 ∀i, j ∈ [1, 3] : Ri.x 6= Rj .x ∨ Ri.y 6= Rj .y. Enforcing
this invariant requires to manually modify the behaviors of robots as well as the architectures by adding new
interactions. This process is error-prone and the resuting system would be more complex and with reduced
readability.
Using our method, we just create an oracle that emits verdict ⊥ in case of collision of two robots
(otherwise the verdict is ⊤c), and the system is automatically instrumented to avoid collisions between
robots. This permits a separation of concerns between the main functionalities of the system and additional
behaviors (e.g., avoiding collisions and ambush coordinates, limiting the number of active robots, etc.).
Table 1 shows the execution times (in seconds) to perform 2 × 105 correct (i.e., no collision) steps.
We generate four different configurations (Supervised, Supervised-d, Supervised-o, Supervised-o-d) of the
supervised system. We use -o to denote that the system is optimized, i.e., only the minimal set of transitions
is instrumented. We use -d to denote that a disabler has been integrated in the system. For each configuration,
we run the system on a map of different sizes (n = 2, 5, 100). Obviously, the number of collisions decreases,
and hence the number of rollbacks also decreases, with the size of the map. For example, if we consider
Supervised-o configuration and the map of size n = 2 we obtain 400, 280 rollbacks and execution time
(to perform 2 × 105 correct steps) 224 seconds. In this case, enabling the disabler (i.e., Supervised-o-d
configuration) reduces the number of rollbacks and hence reduces the execution time (177 seconds). Clearly,
the optimized configurations outperform the non-optimized ones. For maps of sizes 5 and 100 the disabler
slightly reduces the number of collisions since the probability to take again the same step that has lead to
11 Invariants are stutter-invariant safety properties.
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Size (n)
Configuration Supervised Supervised-d Supervised-o Supervised-o-d
#Rollback Time #Rollback Time #Rollback Time #Rollback Time
2 399998 345 267001 282 400280 224 266549 177
5 18039 129 16007 128 18022 82 15630 83
100 68 122 53 120 35 76 50 78
Table 1: Execution times (seconds) and number of rollbacks of the BIP supervised robots
a collision is very small. Thus, in that case, enabling the disabler does not improve the execution time but
adds a small overhead because of the interactions with the disabler.
7 Related Work
Model repair. Recent efforts (e.g., [14]) aim at adapting model-checking abstraction techniques to the model
repair problem. Our approach fundamentally differs from model repair for several reasons. First our ap-
proach operates at runtime: we do not statically modify the model of our system as our properties are
expressive enough so that model-checking is undecidable or does not scale. Moreover, our objective is to
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minimally alter the initial behavior of the system. Correct executions in the initial system are preserved and
yield observationaly equivalent executions in the supervised system.
Theories of fault-tolerance. The theory of fault-tolerance for CBSs was initiated by Arora and Kulkarni [15].
Close to our approach is a framework for fault recovery in CBSs [16]. Bonakdarpour et al. assume a fault-
model as input, i.e., a labelling of all transitions of the system as normal, faulty, and recovery, and then
characterize the conditions for a system to converge to a normal behavior. The authors target non-masking
systems, i.e., systems i) where faults are recovered within a finite number of recovery actions, and ii) that
always make progress. Both the later and our approaches target BIP systems. However, our approach has
fundamental differences. These approaches take as input fault-tolerant programs and assume fault-tolerance
being clearly encoded inside the target program. In [15], the system is seen as a collection of guarded
commands. In [16], fault detection and recovery span across multiple components. Both approaches fall
short in meeting the modularity requirement of CBSs. Indeed, programs in [15] do not have their own
state-space. The fault models considered in [16] assumes fault detection and recovery to concern several
components with inter-dependent interactions.
Supervisory approaches to fault-tolerance. Similar to our approach are techniques based on supervisory-
control theory and controller synthesis a` la Ramadge and Wonham [17]. Similar objectives are to synthesize
a mechanisms that is maximally permissive and ensures fault-tolerance by disabling the controllable tran-
sitions that would either make the system diverge from the expected behavior or prevent it from reaching
the expected behavior. In supervisory approaches the fault is due to a system action (cf. [18]). Faults are
uncontrollable events and after their occurrence, the controller recovers the system within a finite number of
steps. Moreover, the non-faulty part of the system needs to be available and distinguishable from the system.
Such approaches fall in the scope of our framework where monitors can enforce the non-occurrence of a
particular action. Moreover, as BIP systems usually contain data, guards and assignments, it is generally not
possible to statically compute the faulty behavior in the system.
Runtime enforcement for monolithic systems. Several approaches were proposed for the runtime enforce-
ment of (discrete-time) specifications over monolithic systems (cf. [1, 10, 3]). Several sets of enforceable
properties were proposed with their associated enforcement monitors. Restrictions to the set of enforceable
specifications stem from the fact that the considered specifications are over infinite executions sequences.
As shown in [11], when considering specifications over finite sequences, all properties become enforceable.
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In this paper, we consider specifications over finite sequences but point out restrictions arising from the na-
ture of the targeted systems. It is also worth mentioning that the runtime enforcement paradigm proposed in
this paper improves the previous ones. Indeed, upon the detection of bad behaviors, previous enforcement
paradigms proposed to “accumulate events” in a memory (when dealing with progress properties) or halt the
execution of the underlying system (when dealing with safety properties); with the hope that future events
may help to satisfy the property again. The enforcement paradigm proposed in this paper, studied now for
safety properties but stated generally for any property, prevents and avoids the occurrence of faults by re-
verting the effect of events that lead to a deviation from the desired behaviors, leaving the system in a state
just as before the fault occured.
Dynamic techniques for CBSs. Few dynamic approaches exist to improve the reliability of CBSs. Dormoy
et al. proposed FTPL, a customization of Linear Temporal Logic to specify the correctness of component
reconfigurations in the Fractal framework [19]. Then, the authors proposed a runtime verification approach to
the correctness of architectures [20]. Independently, we proposed a runtime verification framework for BIP
systems [9] that augments BIP systems with monitors for the conformance of the runtime behavior against
linear-time properties. All these approaches allowed only the detection of errors and not their correction
using recovery. As the approach in [9] is only concerned with (the simpler problem) of runtime verification, it
considers all properties as monitorable. In this paper, we introduce a notion of enforceable properties specific
to CBS and parametrized by a notion of number of tolerance steps. While the purpose of the transformations
in [9] is to introduce a monitor and transmit snapshots of the system to it, the transformations proposed in
this paper additionally grant the monitor with primitives to backup the system state and control it. As seen
in Sec. 5, to preserve the consistency of the system in case of roll-back, not only the parts of the system
involved with the property are instrumented but also the parts that are “connected” to these.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Conclusion. This paper introduces runtime enforcement for component-based systems described in the BIP
framework. Our approach considers an input system whose behavior may deviate from a desired specifica-
tion. We identify the set of stutter-invariant safety properties as enforceable on component-based systems.
Restrictions on the set of enforceable specifications come from i) the number of steps the system is allowed
to deviate from the specification (before being corrected) and ii) the constraints imposed by instrumenta-
tion. We propose a series of formal transformations of a (non-monitored) system to integrate an enforcement
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monitor, using the oracle of the specification as input. Our validation approach is fully implemented in an
available tool that has been used to enforce deadlock freedom on dining philosophers. As a result, runtime
enforcement provides an interesting complementary validation method as the validity of the specification is
generally either undecidable or leads to an intractable state-explosion problem.
Some perspectives. In the future, we will consider more expressive properties (i.e., non-safety) such as k-
step enforceable properties (with k > 1) to allow transactional behavior. It will entail to find an alternative
instrumentation technique and avoid hard-coding the connections between the initial system and the monitor.
We will consider more dynamic connections between components using the (recent) dynamic version of
BIP [21], combined with a memorization mechanism to store the state-history of components.
Moreover, we will work towards the decentralization of the enforcement monitor and the disabler to
allow them to take decisions alone. The expected benefit is to reduce communication in the system. For this
purpose, we shall inspire from [22] which considers the problem of decentralizing verification monitors in
monolithic systems, and also from [23] which distributes a centralized scheduler of components for a given
distributed architecture.
Furthermore, we shall consider optimization techniques to further reduce the performance impact on the
initial system. For this purpose, we consider using static analysis on both the specification and the system to
reduce the needed instrumentation.
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